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DON’T LEAVE US JUST YET: 
FORUM NON CONVENIENS AND 
THE FEDERAL COURT’S POWER 
TO STAY AND MONITOR ACTIONS 
IN THE “INTEREST OF JUSTICE” 
Mark E. Gray* 
The doctrine of forum non conveniens is best understood as a means to 
“promote the ends of justice.” However, the doctrine’s modern 
application and its interaction with another doctrine, the doctrine of 
judgment enforcement, threatens foreign plaintiffs’ access to justice in 
transnational-litigation matters. This threat is most evident in what has 
been termed “boomerang litigation,” where foreign plaintiffs engage in 
a roundtrip courtroom excursion, from America to a foreign judiciary 
and then back to America for judgment enforcement. In the end, when 
the doctrine of forum non conveniens and the doctrine of judgment 
enforcement are at odds with each other, foreign plaintiffs end up empty 
handed while allegedly liable domestic defendants receive a windfall. 
This Note explores the problems presented by the modern application of 
the doctrine of forum non conveniens in the transnational litigation 
context and proposes a three-pronged, multifaceted approach to 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine the following: a burglar comes into your home, ravages 
your dwelling to find and take what he desires, and leaves your 
home, not as he found it, but rather in shambles. Assume that you 
can show that the burglar did this to your home. How do you feel? 
Does your home feel like it did before? Do you want to hold the 
burglar accountable for this violation? 
Now imagine that this burglary does not just happen over the 
course of one night. Instead, the burglar takes nearly twenty-six years 
to go through your home and take what he wants. To this prolonged 
invasion, add eighteen billion gallons of toxic waste left in 
waterways; hundreds of abandoned, nonremediated waste pits, five 
indigenous tribes’ traditional lifestyles decimated, one tribe 
eradicated, and what do you have?1 A factual recitation aptly coined 
the “Amazon Chernobyl.”2 
This is precisely the situation that the modern application of the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens (the “Doctrine”) has left countless 
Ecuadorians facing at present.3 The Doctrine’s interaction with 
another doctrine, the doctrine of judgment enforcement, threatens to 
leave these foreign plaintiffs without “access to justice.”4 A brief 
overview of the factual circumstances that have led to years of 
litigation in both America and Ecuador will help to better explain 
this threat and why our legal system should take affirmative steps to 
alter it. 
 
 1. Ecuador Court Upholds $8.6 Billion Ruling Against Chevron, CNN (Jan. 4, 2012, 8:35 
AM) [hereinafter CNN], http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/04/world/americas/ecuador-chevron-
lawsuit/index.html; AMAZON DEF. COAL., Understanding Chevron's "Amazon Chernobyl": 
Detailed Background on Landmark Legal Case over Chevron's Environmental Contamination in 
Ecuador 7 (2009), available at http://amazonwatch.org/documents/ecuador-press-kit/detailed-
background.pdf. 
 2. AMAZON DEF. COAL., supra note 1, at 4. 
 3. See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 480 (2d Cir. 2002) (affirming the district 
court’s decision to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens provided Texaco agreed to waive 
the statute of limitations); Patrick Radden Keefe, Why Chevron Will Settle in Ecuador, THE NEW 
YORKER (Jan. 4, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2012/01/why-chevron 
-will-settle-in-ecuador.html. 
 4. Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens and the 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1444, 1450 (2011). 
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In 1964, Texaco, Inc. began “oil exploration and drilling 
activities” for crude oil in the Oriente region of eastern Ecuador.5 
Over the next twenty-six years, Texaco constructed and developed 
oil wells and pipelines and produced innumerable barrels of crude 
oil.6 Allegedly, Texaco’s practices in the Oriente region were less 
than “environmentally sound” and failed to meet both accepted 
international standards and internal company guidelines.7 The 
alleged lack of due care caused damage of “outrageous proportions” 
to the people and environment.8 For example, residents of the 
Oriente region alleged that Texaco failed to take adequate 
precautions and remedial measures in their drilling operations such 
that “streams, rivers, lakes, and aquifers of the Oriente ha[d] become 
so contaminated with oil and oil by-products that the water [in the 
region was] unsuitable for drinking.”9 In addition, these residents 
claimed that nearly seventeen million gallons of oil spilled from 
Texaco’s pipelines due to ruptures and leaks.10 These were just two 
of the many environmental harms that Texaco allegedly caused.11 
These circumstances gave rise to the 1993 complaint in Aguinda 
v. Texaco, Inc.,12 which was filed in a federal district court for the 
Southern District of New York.13 The Aguinda complaint alleged 
that Texaco had caused plaintiffs to suffer “property damage, 
personal injuries, increased risks of cancer and other diseases, and 
ha[d] resulted in the degradation and destruction of the environment 
in which plaintiffs and their families live[d],” all as a result of 
Texaco’s “negligent, reckless, intentional and outrageous acts and 
omissions . . . in connection with its oil exploration and drilling 
operations [in the Oriente region].”14 In 2001, after an eight-year 
 
 5. Complaint at 22, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (No. 93 
Civ. 7527 JSR). 
 6. Id. at 22–23. 
 7. Id. at 23. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 26. 
 10. Id. at 24 (basing the spillage amount on Ecuadorian government estimates). This is six 
million gallons more than the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Id. at 24–25; see also AMAZON DEF. COAL., 
supra note 1, at 4 (estimating the overall damage to be thirty times that of the Exxon Valdez 
spill). 
 11. See Complaint, supra note 5, at 23–27. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 3–4. 
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battle over whether Ecuador was truly an adequate alternative forum, 
Aguinda succumbed to the Doctrine and Texaco secured the 
dismissal it sought.15 Texaco, the proponent of the notion that 
Ecuadorian courts were adequate, succeeded in arguing that the case 
“ha[d] everything to do with Ecuador and nothing to do with the 
United States.”16 As part of the 2001 dismissal, Texaco consented to 
the jurisdiction of the Ecuadorian courts should the plaintiffs refile 
the action there.17 
The Aguinda plaintiffs persisted and refiled suit in an 
Ecuadorian court in 2003.18 By this time, Chevron Corporation had 
purchased Texaco, and it was now the defendant to the action, 
having inherited both the good and the bad from Texaco.19 After 
nearly ten more years of litigation, amid allegations of judicial 
corruption20 and a related lawsuit against one of the plaintiffs’ 
attorneys under RICO,21 an Ecuadorian appellate court upheld an 
$8.6 billion ruling against Chevron in early 2012.22 
On the surface, this seems to have been a victory for the 
plaintiffs. However, this was not the end of the battle. Because 
Chevron has no assets in Ecuador, the plaintiffs will have to search 
elsewhere to recover on the Ecuadorian judgment.23 Cue the doctrine 
of judgment enforcement, which Chevron has vowed to take full 
 
 15. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). The adequate-
alternative-forum showing is just one of the elements required to grant a forum non conveniens 
dismissal. Id. at 538. Of note, this was Texaco’s second motion to dismiss for forum non 
conveniens. Id.; see also Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 1998) (vacating the 
district court’s judgment granting a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens because it did not 
first secure a “commitment by Texaco to submit to the jurisdiction of the Ecuadoran courts for 
purposes of this action”). 
 16. Aguinda, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 537 (quoting District Judge Rakoff on the renewed motion 
to dismiss for forum non conveniens). 
 17. Id. at 538. 
 18. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, at 1447–48. 
 19. See Patrick Radden Keefe, Reversal of Fortune, NEW YORKER (Jan. 9, 2012), 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/01/09/120109fa_fact_keefe. 
 20. See id. 
 21. Complaint at 1–4, Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 2011 WL 979609 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 
2011) (No. 11 Civ. 0691 LAK). RICO is the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act, 
which was a part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. See Organized Crime Control Act 
of 1970, Pub L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 & 28 
U.S.C.). 
 22. CNN, supra note 1 (explaining that if Chevron does not publicly apologize to Ecuador, 
the judgment will be doubled). 
 23. Keefe, supra note 3. 
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advantage of in protecting its American assets.24 In fact, Chevron 
already attempted to do so by requesting an anti-enforcement 
injunction from the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York that would prevent enforcement of the 
Ecuadorian judgment anywhere outside of Ecuador.25 Although the 
district court granted this “extraordinary and unprecedented global 
injunction,” the Second Circuit reversed the lower court’s judgment 
and vacated the injunction.26 
The “Amazon Chernobyl” is not the only example of the 
unfortunate interaction between forum non conveniens and the 
judgment-enforcement doctrines.27 Similar fates have befallen 
plaintiffs who brought suit against defendant corporations like Dole 
Food Company28 and Shell Oil Company29 for alleged injuries 
caused by chemical exposures, only to have their foreign judgments 
declared unenforceable.30 This roundtrip courtroom excursion, from 
America to a foreign judiciary and back to America for judgment 
enforcement, has led to the evocative expression “boomerang 
litigation.”31 
 
 24. See Keefe, supra note 19 (stating that Chevron has likened due process in Ecuador “to 
what one might find in North Korea”); Keefe, supra note 3 (“Chevron lawyers will . . . argue that 
Ecuador is corrupt and that the judgment is fraudulent, and should not be enforced.”). 
 25. See Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 234 (2d Cir. 2012). Note that Chevron’s 
argument for the injunction, in part, directly contradicted the argument that it made to support the 
motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens that prompted the case to be filed in Ecuador. 
Compare Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Chevron 
contends that the judgment is not enforceable outside of Ecuador because (1) the Ecuadorian legal 
system does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of 
due process of law . . . .”), with Brief for Appellee at 56, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 
2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“The most persuasive evidence that Ecuador can and does dispense 
independent and impartial justice in these cases is the record of corruption-free litigation against 
Texaco’s subsidiary and other companies.”). 
 26. See Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 234; Keefe, supra note 3. 
 27. See generally Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, at 1447, 1474–81 (citing case 
examples of the “access to justice” gap that occurs when the doctrines of forum non conveniens 
and judgment enforcement collide). 
 28. Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1352 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (“Because the 
judgment was ‘rendered under a system which does not provide impartial tribunal[s] or 
procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law,’ . . . the judgment is not 
considered conclusive, and cannot be enforced . . . .” (quoting FLA. STAT. § 55.605(1)(a) 
(2009))). Dole is a Delaware corporation. Id. at 1311. 
 29. Shell Oil Co. v. Franco, 2005 WL 6184247, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2005) (granting 
plaintiff Shell Oil Company’s motion for summary judgment and holding that the defendants’ 
Nicaraguan judgment was unenforceable). 
 30. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, at 1475–76, 1478, 1480. 
 31. Id. at 1451. 
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Besides affecting the foreign plaintiffs who file suit in America, 
the interaction between these two doctrines also extends to the 
judiciary itself. At the heart of the doctrine of forum non conveniens 
initially was the idea of justice—that jurisdiction may be declined “in 
the interest of justice.”32 As is evident from the above discussion of 
Aguinda and the multitude of court proceedings in that litigation, the 
current application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens leaves 
serious doubts about whether the “interest of justice” is being served. 
The purpose of this Note is to explore the problems presented by 
the modern application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in 
the transnational litigation context and to propose a multifaceted 
approach to addressing these problems. Part II of this Note discusses 
the historical development of the federal doctrine of forum non 
conveniens, including its transition from a largely domestic doctrine 
to its modern application in international matters. Part III focuses on 
the potential judgment-enforcement obstacle that the modern federal 
doctrine presents for foreign plaintiffs and this obstacle’s 
implications on the “interest of justice.” Part IV proposes a scheme 
for addressing this problem that employs various procedural 
safeguards at multiple stages of the litigation. 
II.  THE FEDERAL DOCTRINE 
OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS 
A.  The Doctrine Recognized: 
A Formal Solution for Domestic Issues 
Prior to the mid-twentieth century in America, the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens was “rarely . . . referred to by name,” despite 
its abundant application in American case law.33 Rising to 
prominence in Scotland,34 and further developed in England,35 the 
 
 32. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 504 (1947) (“Courts of equity and of law also 
occasionally decline, in the interest of justice, to exercise jurisdiction . . . where for kindred 
reasons the litigation can more appropriately be conducted in a foreign tribunal.” (emphasis 
added) (quoting Can. Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S., Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 422–23 (1932)). 
 33. Paxton Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1929); see also Robert Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 
HARV. L. REV. 908, 914, 918–21 (1947) (discussing various applications of the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens in early American case law). 
 34. See Blair, supra note 33, at 20 n.91; Braucher, supra note 32, at 909–10; Joseph Dainow, 
The Inappropriate Forum, 29 ILL. L. REV. 867, 881 & n.58 (1935). 
 35. See Blair, supra note 33, at 20–21. 
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doctrine of forum non conveniens was created by foreign courts to 
provide them the discretion to invoke it in order to serve “the proper 
administration of justice.”36 Initially, this purpose arguably failed to 
translate to American courts.37 However, a 1946 United States 
Supreme Court holding38 solidified the notion that courts can use 
their discretionary power to decline jurisdiction when appropriate.39 
Accordingly, two seminal cases from the Court’s 1947 Term, 
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert40 and Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual 
Casualty Co.,41 brought the Doctrine to the forefront of the federal 
judiciary and gave it two legs on which to stand.42 Both decisions 
expounded on the practice as it existed at the time, solidified it 
further, and provided federal courts with a recognized remedy for 
litigant inconvenience in actions at law.43 
1.  Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert44 
In Gulf Oil Corp., the Court began its analysis of whether a 
United States district court had the “inherent power to dismiss a suit 
pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens”45 with a simple 
premise: “[T]he proposition that a court having jurisdiction must 
 
 36. See, e.g., Société du Gaz de Paris v. Société Anonyme de Navigation “Les Armateurs 
Français,” [1926] Sess. Cas. (H.L.) 13 (Scot.); Logan v. Bank of Scotland, [1906] 1 K.B. 141 (C. 
A. 1905). Although Société appears to suggest that the convenience of the parties was a central 
focus of the doctrinal inquiry, the various criteria considered were merely to effectuate “the 
proper administration of justice [by] fixing the appropriate forum for trial.” Dainow, supra note 
34, at 881–82. 
 37. Braucher, supra note 33, at 912–13. But see Blair, supra note 33, at 1, 22. 
 38. See Williams v. Green Bay & W. R.R. Co., 326 U.S. 549 (1946). In Williams, the Court 
aimed to put the Doctrine in “proper perspective” when it refused to dismiss the case based on the 
difficulty of determining state law. Id. at 554; see Braucher, supra note 33, at 922. 
 39. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). 
 40. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).  
 41. 330 U.S. 518 (1947). 
 42. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 248 n.13 (1981) (“The [forum non 
conveniens] doctrine became firmly established when Gilbert and Koster were decided . . . .”); 
14D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3828.1 (3d ed. 
2011) (“[The Gulf Oil Corp.] decision firmly entrenched the doctrine of forum non conveniens in 
the federal courts.”). 
 43. See Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. 501; Koster, 330 U.S. 518. 
 44. Plaintiff Gilbert, a Virginia resident, filed a tort claim in a New York federal district 
court against defendant Gulf Oil Corporation, a Pennsylvania corporation doing business in 
Virginia and New York, for events occurring in Virginia. Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 502. 
Defendant successfully invoked the doctrine of forum non conveniens, claiming the appropriate 
place for trial was Virginia. Id. at 512. 
 45. Id. at 502. 
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exercise it, is not universally true . . . .”46 In the “interest of justice,” 
courts of equity and of law had declined to exercise jurisdiction 
“where the suit [was] between aliens or non-residents or where for 
kindred reasons the litigation [should] more appropriately be 
conducted in a foreign tribunal.”47 The exercise of jurisdictional 
discretion sparked debate about the extent of such a “power”—one 
that was made evident in Justice Black’s vehement dissent to the 5–4 
Gulf Oil Corp. decision.48 However, limiting a court’s power to 
dismiss under forum non conveniens to courts with equitable 
jurisdiction proved unsatisfactory after the “merger of law and equity 
under the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.”49 
The Gulf Oil Corp. decision resolved this debate by holding that 
forum non conveniens could be used not only in courts of equity but 
also in courts of law.50 The Court stated that while it had recognized 
and approved the Doctrine’s name, it never had rejected the 
Doctrine’s application to actions at law, an extension it viewed as 
necessary.51 Writing the opinion for the Court, Justice Jackson 
summarized the then-current state of the Doctrine for actions at law: 
“The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may 
resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is 
authorized by the letter of a general venue statute.”52 Unlike Justice 
Black, the majority did not believe leaving such discretion to the 
courts would “result in many abuses” at the hands of the judiciary.53 
Recognizing the concern that federal courts would have to 
exercise discretion in determining whether to grant a forum non 
 
 46. Id. at 504 (quoting Can. Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S., Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 422 (1932)). 
 47. Id. (quoting Can. Malting Co., 285 U.S. at 423). 
 48. Id. at 513 (Black, J., dissenting) (“[T]his Court has never before held contrary to the 
general principle that ‘the courts of the United States are bound to proceed to judgment, and to 
afford redress to suitors before them, in every case to which their jurisdiction extends. They 
cannot abdicate their authority or duty in any case in favor of another jurisdiction.’” (quoting 
Chicot Cnty. v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 534 (1893))). 
 49. Braucher, supra note 33, at 925; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (“There is one form of 
action—the civil action.”). 
 50. See Braucher, supra note 33, at 927 (“The principle is simply that a court may resist 
imposition on its jurisdiction.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 51. Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 505 n.4. 
 52. Id. at 507. 
 53. Id. at 508. But see id. at 516 (Black, J., dissenting) (stating that “[t]he Court’s new rule 
will thus clutter the very threshold of the federal courts with a preliminary trial of fact” and the 
discretion given to the federal courts “will inevitably produce a complex of close and 
indistinguishable decisions”). 
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conveniens dismissal, the majority offered guidance for such 
decisions by providing a list of factors to consider.54 The Court 
suggested that by considering both a set of private factors55—those 
interests affecting the litigant—and a set of factors concerning public 
interest,56 a court could more readily make a determination regarding 
dismissal.57 This balancing analysis allowed, and still allows, courts 
to provide a remedy in the event that the plaintiff chose the forum 
strictly to inconvenience the defendant.58 The Court noted, however, 
that from the outset there is a strong presumption in favor of the 
plaintiff’s choice of forum and that dismissal should not be granted 
“unless the balance [of these factors] is strongly in favor of the 
defendant.”59 
 
 54. Id. at 508–09. 
 55. Id. at 508 (“Important considerations are the relative ease of access to sources of proof; 
availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining 
attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to 
the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and 
inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the enforcibility [sic] of a judgment if one is 
obtained.”). 
 56. Id. at 508–09 (“Factors of public interest also have place in applying the doctrine. 
Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled up in congested centers 
instead of being handled at its origin. Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the 
people of a community which has no relation to the litigation. In cases which touch the affairs of 
many persons, there is reason for holding the trial in their view and reach rather than in remote 
parts of the country where they can learn of it by report only. There is a local interest in having 
localized controversies decided at home. There is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial of a 
diversity case in a forum that is at home with the state law that must govern the case, rather than 
having a court in some other forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to 
itself.”). 
 57. The full forum non conveniens analysis is a two-part process: the court (1) makes a 
determination as to “whether there is an available and adequate alternative forum,” and (2) 
balances the private and public factors “to determine whether the court should dismiss the 
plaintiff’s suit in favor of that alternative forum.” Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, at 1456. If 
the proposed alternative forum is not both available and adequate, then the analysis stops there 
and dismissal is denied. See id. “Overall, the alternative forum requirement does not appear to be 
a significant barrier to defendants’ efforts to dismiss transnational litigation in favor of foreign 
courts.” Id. at 1460. 
 58. Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 508 (citing Blair, supra note 33). “It is often said that the 
plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, ‘vex,’ ‘harass,’ or ‘oppress’ the defendant 
by inflicting upon him expense or trouble not necessary to [the plaintiff’s] own right to pursue his 
remedy.” Id. 
 59. See id. 
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2.  Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.60 
On the heels of Gulf Oil Corp. came Koster, another forum non 
conveniens decision, this time involving multiple plaintiffs in the 
“internal affairs” context.61 Like Gulf Oil Corp., Koster dispelled the 
notion that a court that has jurisdiction is necessarily required to 
exercise it.62 Building on the substantial evaluation of the Doctrine in 
Gulf Oil Corp., Koster presented two more developments: multiple 
plaintiffs with equal rights to the cause of action weakened any one 
plaintiff’s choice of forum,63 and a trial involving issues relating to 
the “internal affairs of a foreign corporation” did not require 
dismissal.64 
In expounding on the balancing analysis that courts should 
perform, the Court indicated that a plaintiff should be given the 
benefit of his choice of forum absent facts suggesting that the 
plaintiff tried to deliberately inconvenience the defendant.65 The 
Court modified this presumption, however, for actions involving 
potentially hundreds of similarly situated plaintiffs.66 Under those 
circumstances, as was the case in Koster, a plaintiff’s presumption of 
an appropriate forum was “considerably weakened.”67 The Court 
rationalized modifying the Doctrine on the premise that to adjudicate 
such a matter brings with it more than the “ordinary task” of a trial; 
among other things, it includes far greater administrative effort in 
“relation to the whole group.”68 
 
 60. Plaintiff policyholder Koster, a New York resident, filed a derivative action on behalf of 
all members and policyholders in a New York federal district court against defendant insurance 
company Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company, a company with its principal place of business 
in Illinois. Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 519 (1947) Defendant 
successfully invoked the doctrine of forum non conveniens, claiming the appropriate place for 
trial was Illinois. Id. at 520, 531–32. 
 61. Id. at 518–22. Here, “internal affairs” refers to the business dealings of the defendant 
corporation. See id. at 536. 
 62. Id. at 520 n.1 (stating that previous holdings requiring exercise of jurisdiction “had 
nothing to do with [Koster]” and that “[w]e are concerned here with the autonomous 
administration of the federal courts in the discharge of their own judicial duties, subject of course 
to the control of Congress.”). 
 63. Id. at 524. 
 64. Id. at 527. 
 65. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947). 
 66. Koster, 330 U.S. at 524. 
 67. Id.; see Braucher, supra note 32, at 923. 
 68. See Koster, 330 U.S. at 526. 
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The Court’s opinion further strengthened federal courts’ 
discretionary power by steering away from the idea that forum non 
conveniens in an “internal affairs” context required dismissal.69 The 
Court stated in dicta that “[t]here is no rule of law . . . which requires 
dismissal . . . on a mere showing that the trial will involve issues 
which relate to the internal affairs of a foreign corporation.”70 The 
Court supported this by affirming that the Doctrine “resists 
formalization” and that the better inquiry was whether trial “best 
serve[d] the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice,” 
entitling a corporation’s location to “little consideration.”71 In so 
stating, the Court gave itself more power to dictate when it will or 
will not dismiss, making the Doctrine more malleable than it 
previously was.72 
B.  A Whole New World: 
From a Domestic Doctrine 
to an International Doctrine 
In the years after the Gulf Oil Corp. and Koster decisions, the 
prototypical case in which the Doctrine was normally applied began 
to involve an international dimension.73 As a result, the Court’s 1981 
decision in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno74 represented a fine-tuning of 
the forum non conveniens analysis, focusing the Doctrine more on 
foreign plaintiffs filing suit in American courts against American 
defendants.75 Then, in 2007, the Court decided Sinochem 
 
 69. Id. at 527. 
 70. Id. “Foreign corporations” at this time and in this context refers to corporations with 
their principal place of business or “domicile” outside of the forum state. See id. at 526. 
 71. Id. at 527–28. 
 72. Id. at 526. It is noteworthy that the Court took this opportunity to “clarify” its power to 
dismiss an action. Although it dismissed this case under forum non conveniens, it did so entirely 
based on the balancing analysis described in Gulf Oil Corp. See id. at 535–36. 
 73. See Megan Waples, The Adequate Alternative Forum Analysis in Forum Non 
Conveniens: A Case for Reform, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1475, 1475 (2004) (stating that the doctrine 
“primarily applies in situations involving an international dimension”); see also 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1404(a) (2011) (allowing district courts to transfer civil actions to another district court in the 
interest of justice). 
 74. 454 U.S. 235 (1981). 
 75. David Boyce, Foreign Plaintiffs and Forum Non Conveniens, 64 TEX. L. REV. 193, 195 
(1985) (stating that Piper Aircraft Co. “focuses on the ‘private interests’ of the litigants”); see 
also Waples, supra note 73, at 1475 ( “[T]he [Piper Aircraft Co.] Court gave the doctrine a much 
stronger focus on preventing forum shopping by foreign plaintiffs.”). See generally 14D WRIGHT 
ET AL., supra note 42, § 3828 (“[T]the forum non conveniens principle has become unnecessary 
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International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp.,76 a case 
involving the issue of whether jurisdiction must be conclusively 
established prior to a forum non conveniens dismissal.77 Both of 
these cases have had a direct impact on the number of forum non 
conveniens cases courts hear and the circumstances under which they 
can be decided.78 
1.  Change of Venue, Change of Doctrine 
The Doctrine was quickly altered after being recognized by the 
Supreme Court in 1947. In 1948, Congress adopted § 1404(a) of 
Title 28.79 This federal transfer statute governs transfer among 
federal district courts “in the furtherance of justice.”80 However, it 
alleviated the need for the Doctrine as a means of dismissing 
domestic matters to other more appropriate forums.81 As a result of 
§ 1404(a), forum non conveniens faded from the judicial scene and 
became “only appropriate when the more convenient forum is a 
foreign country.”82 Thirty-three years passed before the Supreme 
Court issued another significant opinion on the Doctrine.83 
 
in most circumstances [and] it is only appropriate when the more convenient forum is in a foreign 
country.”). 
 76. 549 U.S. 422 (2007). 
 77. Id. at 425. 
 78. See Finity E. Jernigan, Forum Non Conveniens: Whose Convenience and Justice?, 86 
TEX. L. REV. 1079, 1088–89 (2008). 
 79. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2011). 
 80. Robert P. Hobson, Forum Non Conveniens Under the United States Judicial Code, 8 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 29, 34 (1951). 
 81. See 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, § 3828 (“The addition of Section 1404(a) to the 
Judicial Code in 1948, which allows courts to transfer a case under certain circumstances to 
another federal court that is more convenient, limited the need for a forum non conveniens 
dismissal.”). 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). 
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2.  Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno84 
After Koster was decided in 1947 and § 1404(a) was adopted in 
1948, the next Supreme Court case regarding the Doctrine to garner 
considerable attention was Piper Aircraft Co.85 There the Court held 
that a plaintiff may not defeat a forum non conveniens dismissal 
merely by demonstrating that the substantive law of the alternate 
forum is less favorable.86 This has led to the Doctrine becoming an 
“automatic defense response to transnational liability actions” and a 
“formidable obstacle [for] foreign plaintiffs.”87 
Unlike its predecessor, Gulf Oil Corp., Piper Aircraft Co. found 
the Court focusing on the first part of the forum non conveniens 
analysis—the adequate-alternative-forum inquiry.88 In Piper Aircraft 
Co., the Court stated that “[t]he doctrine of forum non conveniens . . . 
[was] designed in part to help courts avoid conducting complex 
exercises in comparative law”89 and reasoned that “if the possibility 
of an unfavorable change in substantive law [was] given substantial 
weight in the . . . inquiry, dismissal would rarely be proper.”90 
Although the Court indicated that judges could consider an 
unfavorable change in substantive law,91 it clarified that the correct 
measure for an inadequate alternative forum was whether “the 
 
 84. Id. Plaintiff Reyno, a California court-appointed representative for Scottish decedents of 
an aircraft crash, filed separate wrongful-death suits in a California state court against defendants 
Piper Aircraft Company, a Pennsylvania company, and Hartzell Propeller, Inc., an Ohio 
corporation, for manufacturing the aircraft and its propellers, respectively. Id. at 238–40. 
Defendants first successfully motioned for removal to the United States District Court for the 
Central District of California. Id. at 240. Piper then successfully moved to transfer to the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania and Hartzell had its service quashed, but was amenable to process in 
Pennsylvania. Id. at 240–41. Defendants then successfully invoked the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens, claiming the appropriate place for trial was Scotland. Id. at 238. 
 85. Id. at 235. 
 86. Id. at 247; see Jernigan, supra note 78, at 1090–91. 
 87. Paula C. Johnson, Regulation, Remedy, and Exported Tobacco Products: The Need for a 
Response from the United States Government, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 52 (1991). 
 88. Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 254 n.22 (“At the outset of any forum non conveniens 
inquiry, the court must determine whether there exists an alternative forum.”); Jernigan, supra 
note 78, at 1091. The forum non conveniens “test” involves two separate inquiries: (1) whether an 
alternate forum exists and (2) a balancing of private and public interests (the Gulf Oil Corp. 
factors; see supra Part II.A.1). See 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, §§ 3828, 3828.3, 3828.4. 
Furthermore, the alternate-forum inquiry involves two separate requirements: (1) the availability 
of an alternative forum and (2) the adequacy of the alternative forum. Id. § 3828.3. 
 89. Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 251. 
 90. Id. at 250. 
 91. Id. at 254. 
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remedy offered by the other forum [was] clearly unsatisfactory,” 
such that “it [was] no remedy at all.”92 Moreover, the Court upheld 
the district court’s holding that the presumption favoring plaintiff’s 
choice of forum applied with “less force” when the plaintiff was 
foreign.93 
These distinctions have had an important impact on the Gulf Oil 
Corp. Court’s assertion that the plaintiff’s choice of forum “should 
rarely be disturbed,” since they expanded the exceptions to the 
choice-of-forum presumption.94 There has been growing concern that 
the Court did not consider forums with “less developed legal 
systems” when deciding Piper Aircraft Co., suggesting that these 
exceptions should be limited.95 Legal scholars have noted that 
because the Court has not fully described what constitutes an 
adequate forum since Piper Aircraft Co., foreign plaintiffs from 
places with less developed legal systems frequently face dismissals 
despite showing that the alternate forum is, in essence, inadequate.96 
As a result, these foreign plaintiffs have suffered because of an 
adequacy standard that some consider to be too “easily satisfied.”97 
3.  Sinochem International Co. v. 
Malaysia International Shipping Corp.98 
The Court further expanded the Doctrine when it decided that 
under specific conditions, a court need not have jurisdiction to order 
a forum non conveniens dismissal.99 Relying heavily on precedent,100 
 
 92. Id. at 254 & n.22 (indicating that the initial requirement of the forum non conveniens 
“test” would not be satisfied and dismissal would be improper). 
 93. Id. at 255 (referencing the presumption established in Gulf Oil Corp. that plaintiff’s 
choice of forum “should rarely be disturbed” (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 
508 (1947))). 
 94. Jernigan, supra note 78, at 1089–91. 
 95. See id. at 1092. 
 96. Waples, supra note 73, at 1476 (stating inadequacy arguments such as “procedural 
deficiencies and barriers, lack of resources and corruption and other political problems”); see also 
Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, at 1457 (arguing that such adverse conditions render the 
foreign forum “inadequate” for forum non conveniens dismissals). 
 97. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, at 1457. 
 98. Plaintiff Malaysia International Shipping Company filed a negligent misrepresentation 
suit in a Pennsylvania federal district court against defendant Sinochem International Company, 
Limited. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 427 (2007). Defendant 
successfully invoked the doctrine of forum non conveniens, claiming the appropriate place for 
trial was China, without the court first determining whether or not it had jurisdiction over the 
matter. Id. at 425, 428–29. 
 99. See id. at 435–36. 
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the Sinochem Court held that if a court’s jurisdictional analysis is 
“difficult to determine” and the forum non conveniens analysis 
weighs “heavily in favor of dismissal,” then the court may dismiss 
without conducting the jurisdictional analysis.101 The Court reasoned 
that a trial court could bypass the standard issues of personal and 
subject-matter jurisdiction when “considerations of convenience, 
fairness, and judicial economy so warrant.”102 The Sinochem 
holding, however, left unanswered the question of whether a court 
“conditioning a forum non conveniens dismissal on the waiver of 
jurisdictional or limitations defenses in [a] foreign forum must first 
determine its own authority to adjudicate the case.”103 The 
considerations the Court enumerated that warranted a forum non 
conveniens dismissal, combined with what the Court’s holding left 
unanswered, will have a considerable impact on foreign plaintiffs 
who choose an American forum.104 Consequently, in the relatively 
short time since the Sinochem decision, federal courts are already 
applying Sinochem’s tenets in order to dismiss cases in the 
transnational litigation context with some degree of frequency.105 
 
 100. See Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453 (1994) (“[T]he doctrine of forum 
non conveniens is nothing more or less than a supervening venue provision, permitting 
displacement of the ordinary rules of venue when, in light of certain conditions, the trial court 
thinks that jurisdiction ought to be declined.”). 
 101. Sinochem Int’l Co., 549 U.S. at 436. The Court reasoned that if the forum non 
conveniens analysis is going to result in a dismissal anyway, then a court can properly take the 
“less burdensome” route so that the merits of the case may be determined elsewhere. Id.; see also 
Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (“Without jurisdiction the court 
cannot proceed at all in any cause; it may not assume jurisdiction for the purpose of deciding the 
merits of the case.” (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1868)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 102. Sinochem Int’l Co., 549 U.S. at 432. 
 103. Id. at 435; 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, § 3828. 
 104. Foreign plaintiffs filing suit against American defendants in American courts for 
transnational claims often find that defendants move for dismissal under forum non conveniens 
and agree to waive any jurisdictional or limitations defenses in the foreign forum (i.e., a 
conditional dismissal). See Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, at 1456–57 (“Defendants 
routinely satisfy [the available-alternative-forum] requirement by consenting to the jurisdiction of 
the alternative forum as part of the forum non conveniens motion.”). Dismissals seem primed to 
be granted given the frequent end run around the available-alternative-forum requirement by 
defendants; the low bar for the adequate-alternative-forum requirement, and the courts’ 
willingness to consider convenience, fairness, and judicial economy before determining whether 
it has jurisdiction over the matter. 
 105. See Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. 
REV. 481, 502, 503 & n.116, 504 (2011) (citing a 62 percent dismissal rate in transnational claims 
on forum non conveniens grounds since 2007). 
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The foregoing discussion illustrates how the Doctrine has 
strayed from its original purpose as a means of “proper 
administration of justice” to a standard that does not even require the 
court to have jurisdiction over the matter before dismissing it.106 
III.  GLOBALIZATION OF THE ECONOMY, 
GLOBALIZATION OF HARMS: 
THE MODERN PROBLEM OF AN 
OUTDATED DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS 
As it is currently applied, the Doctrine leaves wide open the 
possibility of a litigation/enforcement nightmare for foreign plaintiffs 
and a potential windfall for allegedly liable domestic defendants.107 
Specifically, the problem arises when the Doctrine interacts with the 
doctrine of judgment enforcement.108 If plaintiffs are able to secure a 
foreign court’s judgment against defendants,109 and defendants have 
no assets located in that same foreign country, plaintiffs are left to 
enforce the foreign judgment elsewhere—usually in the United 
States.110 Because the doctrine of judgment enforcement weighs 
criteria separately from and differently than the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens,111 plaintiffs with a foreign-based judgment can 
effectively “be denied meaningful access to justice.”112 This denial of 
 
 106. See supra Part II. 
 107. See Christina Weston, Comment, The Enforcement Loophole: Judgment-Recognition 
Defenses as a Loophole to Corporate Accountability for Conduct Abroad, 25 EMORY INT’L L. 
REV. 731, 750 (2011) (“If the corporation is successful in having the suit dismissed under [forum 
non conveniens], the corporation is dealt a lucky hand of cards . . . .”). 
 108. See Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, at 1450. 
 109. Recent trends suggest, particularly in Latin American countries, that the likelihood of 
plaintiffs securing foreign-based judgments against American defendant-corporations is on the 
rise. See id. at 1447; see also M. Ryan Casey & Barrett Ristroph, Boomerang Litigation: How 
Convenient Is Forum Non Conveniens in Transnational Litigation?, 4 BYU INT’L L. & MGMT. 
REV. 21, 21 (2007) (“Latin American countries are establishing regimes that are unreceptive to 
the influence of American multinational corporations.”). This trend has led to the phrase “forum 
shopper’s remorse” to describe defendants who were granted dismissals based on forum non 
conveniens only to have a judgment entered against them abroad. Whytock & Robertson, supra 
note 4, at 1447. 
 110. See Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, at 1450; see also Casey & Ristroph, supra note 
109, at 51 (“As plaintiffs achieve victories in Latin American courts, more judgment enforcement 
cases are likely to find their way to U.S. courts.”). Note that in the cases mentioned in Part II, the 
foreign plaintiffs presumably began their lawsuits in the United States because defendants 
controlled no assets in the foreign country from which the plaintiff could easily recover any 
foreign judgment. See supra Part II. 
 111. See infra Part III.A. 
 112. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, at 1450. 
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meaningful access runs contrary to a core tenant of the Doctrine—
that “forum non conveniens [be] construed as an ‘instrument of 
justice.’”113 The next section discusses the Doctrine’s interaction 
with the doctrine of judgment enforcement, while the following 
section briefly reintroduces the idea of protecting “the interest of 
justice” and examines the Doctrine’s implications on issues of 
comity and foreign relations. 
 A.  The Doctrine of Judgment Enforcement’s 
Interaction with Forum Non Conveniens 
The doctrine of forum non conveniens, as it is currently applied, 
does not take into account potential foreign-based judgment-
enforcement issues.114 And it is no wonder that it does not—
judgment enforcement was not the focus when the doctrine was 
formally adopted in the mid-1940s to address venue concerns for 
domestic disputes.115 But with the implementation of § 1404(a) to 
handle those situations and the marked increase in the globalization 
of the economy and international interaction,116 what remains is an 
interaction of these two doctrines that has become a sticking point 
for foreign plaintiffs.117 
On the surface, enforcing a foreign judgment does not seem to 
be problematic. In this regard, thirty-two states have adopted the 
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (UFMJRA) in 
some form.118 The UFMJRA makes foreign judgments enforceable 
in a signatory state, similar to how judgments of sister states are 
“entitled to full faith and credit.”119 The rationale behind such a 
 
 113. Helen E. Mardirosian, Developments in the Law: Federal Jurisdiction and Forum 
Selection, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1643, 1645 (2004) (quoting Williams v. Green Bay & W. R.R. 
Co., 326 U.S. 549, 554 (1946)). 
 114. See generally Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, at 1462 (discussing that forum non 
conveniens analysis occurs at the beginning of transnational litigation, while judgment 
enforcement occurs at the end of the litigation process). 
 115. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 502 (1947); Koster v. Lumbermens 
Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 519 (1947). 
 116. 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, § 3828; Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Conflict 
and Jurisdictional Equilibration: Paths to a Via Media?, 26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 385, 395 & n.30 
(2004) (“[F]orum non conveniens quickly became relevant in federal litigation only in cases 
where the alternative forum was outside of the United States.”). 
 117. See Weston, supra note 107, at 735. 
 118. See id. at 738–39. 
 119. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT §§ 2–3, 13, pt. II U.L.A. 46, 49 
(2002) (stating that “any foreign judgment that is final and conclusive and enforceable where 
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move is that if the United States is willing to recognize foreign 
judgments, foreign countries will reciprocate and recognize 
American judgments.120 
However, the UFMJRA also provides reasons to not recognize a 
foreign judgment.121 Section 4 of the UFMJRA provides two types of 
grounds for nonrecognition: discretionary and mandatory.122 
Discretionary grounds for nonrecognition include insufficient notice, 
judgment obtained by fraud, public policy concerns, and conflicting 
judgments.123 The mandatory grounds include the foreign court’s 
lack of personal or subject-matter jurisdiction.124 Additionally, if the 
judgment was “rendered under a system which does not provide 
impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of 
due process of law,” then this is mandatory grounds for 
nonrecognition.125 Although any of the provisions listed under § 4 of 
the UFMJRA may be cause for concern for a plaintiff, the 
impartiality and due-process nonrecognition provisions are where the 
doctrine of judgment enforcement collides with the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens most fiercely.126 
As mandatory grounds for nonrecognition, the impartiality and 
due-process provisions of the UFMJRA require courts to evaluate 
the adequacy of the foreign forum.127 This entails inquiring into the 
fairness and impartiality of the foreign judiciary for a defendant, not 
a plaintiff.128 On the other hand, “federal courts appear loathe to look 
too closely at the character or the quality of justice in the proposed 
 
rendered” is “enforceable in the same manner as the judgment of a sister state which is entitled to 
full faith and credit”). 
 120. See Weston, supra note 107, at 739. 
 121. See UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4, 13, pt. II U.L.A. 58–59 
(2002). 
 122. See id. 
 123. See id. § 4(b)(1)–(6). 
 124. Id. § 4(a)(2)–(3). 
 125. Id. § 4(a)(1). Recall the grounds on which the judgment in Osorio v. Dole Food Co. was 
denied. See supra note 28. 
 126. See Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, at 1469–71 (stating that the UFMJRA requires 
U.S. courts to “evaluate the adequacy of foreign legal systems”). 
 127. Id. at 1469; see Weston, supra note 107, at 742–43. 
 128. See Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, at 1470–71; see also Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 
No. 0722693-CIV, 2009 WL 48189, at *15 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 5, 2009) (noting that the question in a 
judgment enforcement inquiry is whether the “judicial system is fair and impartial to the . . . 
[d]efendants, not whether [the foreign forum] would provide the [p]laintiffs with an adequate 
alternative forum”). 
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alternative forum or the competence of its judicial personnel” for the 
benefit of the plaintiff when performing the adequate-alternative-
forum analysis in a forum non conveniens determination.129 
Underscoring this is American courts’ reluctance to find the 
proposed alternative forum inadequate based on “general accusations 
of corruption, delay, or other problems with the alternative forum’s 
judicial system.”130 As a result, the bar for determining alternate-
forum adequacy in a forum non conveniens analysis is “quite low”—
it will be adequate “as long as the plaintiff will not be deprived of all 
remedies or subjected to unfair treatment.”131 
Thus, the two doctrines are at odds with each other: forum non 
conveniens’s adequacy analysis does not look at the quality of the 
alternative forum, while the doctrine of judgment enforcement 
requires the courts to inquire about the foreign judiciary’s “fairness, 
impartiality, corruption, and other qualities.”132 Because of the 
discrepancies in the standards used to evaluate the alternative forum 
at these two discrete points in the litigation, the defendant’s 
seemingly incompatible arguments—one to dismiss for forum non 
conveniens to an adequate alternate forum, the other to find a foreign 
judgment from that alternative forum unenforceable—can be 
completely consistent.133 The defendant is therefore able to take 
advantage of an “enforcement loophole” to escape being held 
accountable for harm it was adjudged to have committed.134 
B.  The Intersection Between 
a Forum Non Conveniens Dismissal 
and the Judiciary: The “Interest of Justice,” 
Comity, and Foreign Relations 
Although judges and scholars have made many statements over 
the years about the purpose of the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens,135 the Doctrine is perhaps best understood as a means to 
 
 129. 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, § 3828.3. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, at 1470. 
 133. See id. at 1449–50. 
 134. See Weston, supra note 107, at 735. 
 135. See Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, at 1454–56. 
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“promote the ends of justice.”136 This is how it was understood in 
Scotland and England in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.137 This is how it was understood in America when it was 
adopted by the Gulf Oil Corp. Court.138 
When a court dismisses a transnational case to a foreign forum 
under the Doctrine, it is deciding that the plaintiff should be denied 
access to the U.S. judiciary on that action.139 This, in and of itself, is 
not problematic and does not run afoul of the “interest of justice” 
notion. But when a plaintiff whose action is dismissed under the 
Doctrine is then denied recovery of a foreign judgment on the merits 
of the claim, it is difficult to believe such a conundrum comports 
with the Doctrine’s intent of promoting the ends of justice.140 
The intersection of forum non conveniens and the doctrine of 
judgment enforcement also implicates larger, more political 
concerns—those of comity and foreign relations.141 For example, 
“blocking statutes” have begun to sprout up in Latin American 
countries in response to forum non conveniens dismissals of actions 
brought by their citizens.142 Although a full discussion of these issues 
is outside the purview of this Note,143 suffice it to say that comity 
and foreign relations are important interests that would also benefit 
 
 136. Id. at 1455; see, e.g., Can. Malting Co., v. Paterson S.S., Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 423 (1932) 
(“Courts of equity and of law . . . occasionally decline, in the interest of justice, to exercise 
jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 137. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text. 
 138. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 139. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, at 1454. 
 140. Besides the obvious hardship this places on the plaintiff trying to recover for harms 
inflicted on him or her, it also leads to judicial inefficiency. See, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 
667 F.3d 232, 234 n.1 (2d Cir. 2012) (“An underinclusive Westlaw search for Chevron or Texaco 
& Ecuador & ‘Lago Agrio’ yields fifty-six results, all of which deal directly with this litigation.”). 
Such judicial inefficiency can hardly be said to “promote the ends of justice.” 
 141. Comity refers to the “recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the 
legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international 
duty and convenience.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 304 (9th ed. 2009). 
 142. See Casey & Ristroph, supra note 109, at 26–40. 
 143. For discussions on the issues of comity and foreign relations, see Cassandra Burke 
Robertson, Transnational Litigation and Institutional Choice, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1081 (2010); 
Casey & Ristroph, supra note 109; Virginia A. Fitt, The Tragedy of Comity: Questioning the 
American Treatment of Inadequate Foreign Courts, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 1021 (2010); Jernigan, 
supra note 78. 
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from restructuring the interaction of the forum non conveniens and 
judgment-enforcement doctrines.144 
The foregoing suggests that reform measures are needed to bring 
the Doctrine into modern times and make it workable in our 
increasingly globalized world in which American corporations 
frequently look to, and use, foreign markets to support their business 
affairs.145 With this as a fact of the times we live in, it stands to 
reason that more foreign plaintiffs will file suit against these 
American corporations to redress any harms that befall them while 
our corporations conduct business in their countries.146 The next Part 
will venture to address the “access to justice” gap that can occur in 
transnational-litigation cases in a manner that preserves the 
Doctrine’s original focus—the “interest of justice.”147 
IV.  A MULTIFACETED SCHEME: 
IMPARTIAL EVALUATION OF THE FOREIGN FORUM, 
STAYING THE ACTION, AND MONITORING THE FOREIGN PROCEEDING 
Many legal scholars and law school students have considered 
the interaction between the doctrine of forum non conveniens and the 
doctrine of judgment enforcement.148 Some have suggested 
aggressive dismissal conditions, or stipulations, as a way to avoid 
“boomerang litigation.”149 However, even if the parties meet any 
 
 144. Briefly put by Justice Doggett of the Supreme Court of Texas, “[C]omity requires U.S. 
courts to hold U.S. companies accountable for torts committed abroad[,]” and this is “‘best 
achieved by avoiding the possibility of incurring the wrath and distrust of the Third World’”—in 
other words, by not “dismissing these cases.” Casey & Ristroph, supra note 109, at 43 (quoting 
Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 687 (Tex. 1990)). 
 145. See Dante Figueroa, Are There Ways Out of the Current Forum Non Conveniens 
Impasse Between the United States and Latin America?, 1 BUS. L. BRIEF 42, 42 (2005) 
(describing the effects of globalization). 
 146. See Whytock, supra note 105, at 490–91. However, not everyone considers an increase 
in transnational litigation to be a foregone conclusion. Id. at 533 (suggesting that transnational 
litigation is not yet at a point that it is “likely to have a net negative effect on foreign relations or 
economic welfare”). 
 147. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, at 1450. 
 148. See, e.g., Cortelyou Kenney, Disaster in the Amazon: Dodging “Boomerang Suits” in 
Transnational Human Rights Litigation, 97 CAL. L. REV. 857 (2009); Weston, supra note 107; 
Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4. 
 149. See, e.g., Kenney, supra note 148, at 865–66 (suggesting aggressive dismissal 
stipulations as a way to solve the interaction between the two doctrines without having to change 
either doctrine as it is currently applied). Kenney also discusses the idea of “return clauses”—
dismissal conditions that permit the district court to resume jurisdiction if a catastrophic event 
occurs in the foreign forum (like civil war)—as a way to “provide backstops against faulty 
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dismissal conditions, it is still possible that foreign judgments may 
not be recognized in a judgment-enforcement proceeding. Others 
have proposed changes of judicial estoppel or conditional consent to 
enforcement, which would place the risk of changes in the foreign 
forum’s judicial adequacy on the defendant.150 Still others have 
suggested excluding at enforcement proceedings the relitigation of 
issues considered during the forum non conveniens stage.151 All of 
these suggestions have one thing in common—the original suit 
before the district court has been dismissed. 
In contrast, this Note suggests a scheme for handling motions to 
dismiss for forum non conveniens in the transnational-litigation 
context that does not include dismissing the original action should an 
alternate forum be the more appropriate location for litigating the 
matter. By employing safeguards from the moment a motion is 
filed,152 through a motion’s determination,153 and after a motion is 
granted,154 the court can protect the “interest of justice” in 
transnational-litigation matters. 
This Note suggests a three-pronged system of safeguarding the 
“interest of justice” that (1) incorporates the use of a master to 
evaluate the proposed alternate forum; (2) requires courts to stay the 
action rather than dismiss it; and (3) has the master conduct 
postmotion functions, such as the investigation and enforcement of 
decrees, in cases where there have been successful forum non 
conveniens motions. The ultimate goal of this approach is that if the 
district court finds reason to reinstate the original proceeding at any 
time during the foreign proceeding, it may do so to protect the 
“interest of justice.” 
 
process.” Id. at 902. However, these provisions can be controversial, and it is unclear whether 
they comport with Supreme Court precedent on the Doctrine. See id. at 902 & n.214. 
 150. See Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, at 1500–09. A judicial-estoppel solution 
requires “applying similar adequacy standards” under both doctrines—a solution that would 
require changing one, or both, doctrines. Id. at 1502. The other solutions noted in the text still 
allow for nonrecognition at the judgment-enforcement stage should the due-process or 
impartiality requirements of the UFMJRA not be met. Id. at 1508–09. 
 151. See, e.g., Weston, supra note 107, at 762 (noting the theory of claim preclusion, or res 
judicata). 
 152. See infra Part IV.A. 
 153. See infra Part IV.B. 
 154. See infra Part IV.C. 
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A.  First Prong: Appointing a Master to 
Impartially Evaluate the Foreign Forum 
Historically, trial courts have relied solely on parties’ briefs and 
declarations when considering a motion to dismiss for forum non 
conveniens.155 However, this does not provide the court with an 
unbiased perspective on the proposed alternative forum given the 
adversarial nature of our judicial system.156 Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure (FRCP) 53 provides a vehicle by which district courts can 
achieve this unbiased perspective—a master.157 A court appoints a 
master to perform duties it outlines—largely those having to do with 
pre- and posttrial matters, although not exclusively so—when it 
needs particular assistance.158 
Masters have been used in federal courts since the beginning of 
the nation, and their powers and duties have been confirmed by 
judicial precedent.159 FRCP 53 authorizes masters to be appointed by 
a district judge160 to “address pretrial and posttrial matters that 
cannot be effectively and timely addressed by an available district 
judge or magistrate judge of the district.”161 Such matters can 
include, but are not limited to, “the determination of foreign law,” 
“discovery related matters that under normal circumstances could be 
addressed by a judge,” and posttrial enforcement of judgments or 
 
 155. See, e.g., Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp. Berhad v. Sinochem Int’l Co., No. Civ.A. 03-3771, 
2004 WL 503541 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2004) (citing parties’ briefs in the Memorandum and Order 
granting Sinochem’s motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens). 
 156. The Author recognizes that there can be no truly unbiased perspective, even when it 
comes from a nonparty to the litigation who presents “all” sides of an issue, simply because any 
person’s background and experiences will shape how he or she understands and conveys 
information. 
 157. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53. 
 158. 9C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, § 2601. For a thorough exegesis on the history of the 
master in the American legal landscape, see Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: 
Equity Procedure, Due Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 
CORNELL L. REV. 1181 (2005). 
 159. 9C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, § 2601; see, e.g., In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 310–
14 (1920) (using the term “auditor” instead of master). 
 160. See Satyam Computer Servs., Ltd. v. Venture Global Eng’g, LLC, 323 F. App’x 421, 
430–31 (6th Cir. 2009) (deciding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by appointing a 
special master with knowledge of Indian law or adopting the special master’s findings); Hofmann 
v. EMI Resorts, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (appointing a special master in 
order to “sort all of [the evidence] out”). The district court may act on its own motion to appoint a 
master. 9C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, § 2603. 
 161. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a)(1)(C). 
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decrees and investigations.162 Typically, a master “conducts himself 
or herself as would a district or magistrate judge.”163 A master’s 
powers over a particular matter can be wide-ranging and include 
regulating all proceedings, compelling and taking evidence, and 
imposing sanctions against noncompliant parties.164 In sum, a master 
may “take all measures necessary or proper for the efficient 
performance of the duties assigned to him or her.”165 
Although FRCP 53 places some limits on the scope of why a 
master may be appointed,166 a district court’s discretion in appointing 
masters is broad.167 For example, masters have been appointed for 
their technical expertise in patent law,168 special knowledge of 
foreign law,169 and expertise in ERISA law.170 Masters have also 
been appointed to monitor, investigate, and enforce judgments,171 as 
well as supervise compliance with stipulations.172 
Appointing a master to conduct an evaluation of a proposed 
foreign forum seems to fall within what has traditionally been 
approved by courts.173 Forum non conveniens calls upon the court to 
make determinations regarding the adequacy of a foreign forum, in 
addition to weighing a set of factors that may include “questions as 
to the enforcibility [sic] of a judgment if one is obtained.”174 The 
“enforceability” factor is one that may be more appropriately 
handled by a master with special knowledge of the foreign forum and 
 
 162. 9C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, §§ 2602–02.1. 
 163. Id. § 2602.2. 
 164. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(c) (“Unless the appointing order directs otherwise . . . .”). 
 165. 9C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, § 2609. 
 166. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a)(1). 
 167. 9C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, § 2602.1 (“[J]udicial discretion and flexibility of use 
remain the hallmarks of practice under [FRCP] 53.”). 
 168. See Smart Parts, Inc. v. WDP Ltd., No. 02-1557-KI, 2005 WL 35834, at *3 (D. Or. 
Jan. 7, 2005). 
 169. See Satyam Computer Servs., Ltd. v. Venture Global Eng’g, LLC, 323 F. App’x 421, 
430–31 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 170. See Hatteberg v. Red Adair Co., Emps. Profit Sharing Plan & Its Related Trust, 79 F. 
App’x 709, 719–20 (5th Cir. 2003) (approving the appointment of two special masters due to the 
“difficulty of the ERISA issues in the case”). 
 171. See Sukumar v. Direct Focus, Inc., 349 F. App’x 163, 164–65 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 172. See G.G. Marck & Assocs., Inc. v. Peng, No. 3:05 CV 7391, 2006 WL 1793252, at *3 
(N.D. Ohio June 27, 2006). 
 173. See supra notes 158–165 and accompanying text. 
 174. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506–08 (1947); see also supra notes 55–56 
(listing the private and public factors to be considered). 
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foreign law, as district court judges are generalists175 and not experts 
on foreign judiciaries.176 By appointing a master to further delve into 
the adequacy of the alternate forum and any enforceability concerns, 
district court judges can make a more informed decision regarding a 
motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens and the likelihood of 
future judgment-enforcement issues should the motion be granted. 
The more searching inquiry that a master would be able to provide in 
forum non conveniens analysis would go a long way toward meeting 
the Doctrine’s original goal of serving the “interest of justice.”177 
Appointing a master also brings up the question of 
compensation, but FRCP 53 accounts for that reality.178 The court 
may proportionally assign the master’s compensation to one or more 
parties based on the degree to which each party is responsible “for 
the reference to [the] master.”179 The amount to be provided to the 
master “should be liberal, but not exorbitant” in order to “adequately 
remunerate[]” the master for “execut[ing the court’s] decrees 
thoroughly, accurately, impartially, and in full response to the 
confidence extended.”180 
The question is then which party or parties pay for the master. 
The most logical conclusion is the movant in the motion to dismiss 
for forum non conveniens (in all likelihood, the defendant). This will 
normally be the party “more responsible . . . for the reference to [the] 
master.”181 And this makes sense because the plaintiff is the one who 
 
 175. See generally Diane P. Wood, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 
Generalist Judges in a Specialized World, Speech at the Eighth Annual Judge Irving L. Goldberg 
Lecture Series, (Feb. 11, 1997), in 50 SMU L. REV. 1755, 1756–59, 1766 (1997) (characterizing 
federal district court judges as generalists). 
 176. See 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, § 3508 (outlining the specialized courts created 
by Congress). 
 177. Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 504 (quoting Can. Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S., 285 U.S. 
413, 422–23 (1932)). 
 178. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53(g). 
 179. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(g)(2)–(3); see also Holden v. S.S. Kendall Fish, 395 F.2d 910, 913 
(5th Cir. 1968) (affirming the assessment of the master’s fee against the appellants); Heiberg v. 
Hasler, 1 F.R.D. 735, 737 (E.D.N.Y. 1941) (taking into account the parties’ financial situations 
when deciding to apportion the master’s fees to the more affluent defendant as opposed to the 
plaintiff). 
 180. Newton v. Consol. Gas Co., 259 U.S. 101, 105 (1922). 
 181. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(g)(3). 
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chose the district court as his or her preferred forum and the 
defendant-movant is the one asking to go elsewhere.182 
It follows from the discussion of FRCP 53 above that the court 
could appoint a master to provide assistance in a forum non 
conveniens determination. The master would provide specialized 
knowledge of the foreign judiciary in question to ensure that the 
court renders a decision that comports with the “interest of 
justice.”183 If the master’s evaluation falls on the side of concern 
about future judgment enforcement or the practices and impartiality 
of the foreign judiciary (UFMJRA recognition concerns), a district 
court judge may want to exercise his or her discretion to deny the 
motion to dismiss and proceed to trial. If the district court disagrees 
with the master’s findings, or if the master instead determines that 
the foreign judiciary does meet the “interest of justice,” then the 
court should stay the action, as opposed to dismissing it. Staying an 
action on grounds of forum non conveniens is the subject of the next 
section. 
B.  Second Prong: Staying, 
Rather than Dismissing, the Action 
It should be no huge secret where the defendant likely retains 
assets at the time the defendant files the motion to dismiss for forum 
non conveniens.184 If the proposed foreign forum is a country where 
the defendant has no assets, the court should recognize that any 
future monetary judgment for the plaintiff will have to be enforced 
outside of the proposed foreign forum. In all likelihood, since the 
plaintiff filed in an American court, the defendant will have assets in 
 
 182. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255–56 (1981) (discussing the deference 
afforded to a plaintiff’s choice of forum). 
 183. Stephen B. Burbank offers a biting criticism of American courts’ understanding of 
foreign judiciaries that further warrants the specialized knowledge of a master. Professor Burbank 
states: 
American courts have no coherent or consistent view of the role or weight, if any, that 
should be given in forum non conveniens analysis to the constellation of legal rules and 
arrangements that determines whether a putative plaintiff has real, as opposed to 
theoretical, access to court and to means of proof essential to gain a remedy. 
Burbank, supra note 116, at 397. Moreover, should the motion to dismiss not be denied, Professor 
Burbank’s observation supports granting a stay, rather than a dismissal, so that the court may 
monitor the situation abroad to ensure that a plaintiff is “getting a fair deal.” See infra Part IV.B. 
 184. For instance, the actions described in Part I were all brought against American 
corporations whose principal places of business were in the United States. See supra Part I. 
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America and a judge can foresee that judgment enforcement in 
America may become a contested issue down the road if there are 
questions as to the adequacy of the foreign judiciary. Thus, the easy 
scenario exists when the master’s findings suggest that the foreign 
forum may not be suitable for future potential judgment 
enforcement: the court should deny the motion and the parties should 
continue on to trial in the district court. But what if the trial judge 
grants the motion to dismiss? Doing so relieves the district court of 
jurisdiction over the matter. The answer, instead, should be to 
conditionally stay the action. 
A stay is “[t]he postponement or halting of a proceeding, 
judgment, or the like.”185 By conditionally staying an action, the 
district court retains jurisdiction over the case while it proceeds in a 
foreign judiciary until certain conditions are met, like fulfilling any 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff.186 Thus, if the defendant attempts 
to invoke the doctrine of judgment enforcement as a “loophole” 
mechanism to escape liability, the staying court can resume 
proceedings in the matter.187 
The following subsections examine California’s practice of 
staying an action subject to a motion to dismiss for forum non 
conveniens, as opposed to dismissing the action, and suggest that the 
federal courts adopt a similar procedure. 
 
 185. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1548 (9th ed. 2009). 
 186. It is not unusual for courts to include conditions, such as the defendant waiving personal 
jurisdiction in the foreign forum or any applicable statute-of-limitations defense, under a stay or a 
dismissal. See Sussman v. Bank of Isr., 801 F. Supp. 1068, 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (conditioning 
the dismissal for forum non conveniens on the defendant waiving any statute of limitations 
defense in the foreign forum); Stangvik v. Shiley, Inc., 819 P.2d 14, 17 (Cal. 1991) (“[The trial 
court] stayed the actions, and retained jurisdiction to make such further orders as might become 
appropriate. The order [staying the action] was subject to seven conditions, with which 
defendants agreed to comply.”). The Author recommends that courts should impose another 
condition and stay an action until the defendant is relieved of liability, either through fulfilling 
any judgment entered against it or by receiving a judgment in its favor by the foreign judiciary. 
 187. See infra note 208 and accompanying text. 
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1.  Forum Non Conveniens in California: 
Stangvik v. Shiley, Inc.188 
Although the doctrine of forum non conveniens was first applied 
in California in the mid-1950s,189 the seminal case describing the 
Doctrine in California is Stangvik v. Shiley, Inc.190 The case involved 
foreign plaintiffs pursuing actions against American corporations in a 
California state court.191 The Supreme Court of California granted 
review of the actions to “address the question of the appropriate 
standards to be applied in deciding whether a trial court should grant 
a motion based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens when the 
plaintiff [is] a resident of a foreign country.192 
The Stangvik court clearly articulated a two-pronged test for 
determining whether to grant a motion based on forum non 
conveniens.193 Largely relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis 
in Piper Aircraft Co.,194 the California supreme court instructed 
courts to conduct a threshold inquiry to determine if the alternate 
forum is “suitable” and then balance the private and public interests 
at stake.195 Ultimately, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the 
lower courts’ decisions to grant the defendants’ motion by staying 
the action.196 
 
 188. 819 P.2d 14 (Cal. 1991). Families of a deceased Swedish patient and a deceased 
Norwegian patient filed a products-liability suit against defendants Shiley, Inc. and its parent 
company in a California superior court for manufacturing allegedly faulty heart-valve implants. 
Id. at 16. Defendants moved to dismiss or stay the actions on the ground of forum non 
conveniens. Id. The trial court stayed the action provided that defendants stipulated to a number 
of conditions, including submission to the jurisdiction of the respective foreign forums. Id. at 17 
& n.2. The appellate court affirmed, as did the California supreme court. Id. at 17. 
 189. See id. (citing Price v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 268 P.2d 457 (Cal. 1954)). 
 190. Stangvik v. Shiley, Inc., 819 P.2d. 14 (Cal. 1991). 
 191. Id. at 16. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 17. 
 194. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). 
 195. Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 17–19. As described by the California supreme court in Stangvik, 
suitability is based on “whether an action may be commenced in the alternative jurisdiction and a 
valid judgment obtained there against the defendant,” id. at 18 n.3, while the private and public 
interests to be balanced are similar to those enumerated in Gulf Oil Corp. Id. at 17–18 (citing to 
Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 259–61, and Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507–09 
(1947)). 
 196. Id. at 27. Of note is the trial court’s decision to stay the actions as opposed to dismissing 
them. Id. at 17. Despite finding the alternative forums to be more appropriate for resolving the 
actions, the trial court stayed the actions in order “to make such further orders as might become 
appropriate.” Id. (emphasis added). 
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2.  Forum Non Conveniens in California: 
Guimei v. General Electric Co.197 
A more recent California case also instructive on addressing 
motions to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens is Guimei 
v. General Electric Co.198 It similarly involved an American 
defendant-corporation and foreign plaintiffs.199 The California 
statute200 authorizing dismissal of an action to another forum in the 
interest of “substantial justice” also allows for the court to stay the 
action.201 Like the court in Stangvik, the trial court in Guimei ordered 
the consolidated actions stayed.202 This decision was later affirmed 
by a California appellate court.203 
In reaching its decision, the trial court engaged in the analysis 
required by Stangvik—it determined that both prongs of the forum 
non conveniens analysis were met in the consolidated actions.204 As 
discussed in Parts II.A and II.B of this Note, a similar analysis is 
typical in federal forum non conveniens cases.205 However, unlike 
federal forum non conveniens cases, in which dismissals seem to be 
the norm should the motions be granted,206 the California supreme 
 
 197. On November 21, 2004, China Eastern Yunnan Airlines flight MU5210 crashed in Inner 
Mongolia, killing all passengers, crew members, and two bystanders on the ground. Guimei v. 
Gen. Electric Co., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 178, 182 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). Subsequently, plaintiff Guimei, 
a relative of a crash victim, along with other plaintiffs, filed suit against defendants General 
Electric, Bombardier, Bombardier Aerospace, and China Eastern Airlines Company in a Superior 
Court of California for the County Los Angeles. Id. The cases were consolidated and defendants 
moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, stay on the ground of forum non conveniens, claiming the 
appropriate place for trial was China. Id. at 183. As part of their motion, each defendant made 
“commitment[s]” (or stipulations) to several conditions should the motion have been granted. Id. 
The trial court granted a conditional stay of the consolidated actions to permit the proceedings in 
China and scheduled status conferences for every six months to monitor the progress of the 
Chinese proceedings. Id. The California Court of Appeals affirmed the conditional stay. Id. at 
193. 
 198. 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 178 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
 199. Id. at 182. 
 200. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.30 (West 2011). 
 201. Id. § 410.30(a). 
 202. Guimei, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 183–85. 
 203. Id. at 193. 
 204. See Respondents’ Brief at 11–12, Guimei v. Gen. Electric Co., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 178 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2009) (Nos. B201016, B201021, B201023, B201012). 
 205. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 
330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947). 
 206. See, e.g., Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007) 
(dismissing the action); Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. 235 (dismissing the action). 
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court seems to view dismissal as the exception.207 In Guimei, as in 
any case in which a stay is granted, the stay allowed the trial court to 
retain jurisdiction over the consolidated actions, enabling it to 
resume the proceedings if the foreign actions were “unreasonably 
delayed” or “fail[ed] to reach a resolution on the merits.”208 Thus, the 
trial court could have revisited the question of whether to try the 
consolidated actions if the defendants did not follow through with the 
stipulations they made or if the foreign judiciary did not accept 
jurisdiction over the foreign action.209 
The appellate court also noted that if the plaintiffs had 
“thwart[ed]” the foreign proceedings, the trial court had the option to 
lift the stay and grant a full dismissal of the California action.210 This 
makes sense as an appropriate “safety valve” for the defendants who 
brought the forum non conveniens motion and who likely made 
various stipulations to submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign forum. 
By including this “safety valve,” plaintiffs, who face litigating in a 
forum not of their choosing, are discouraged from impeding the 
foreign proceeding in an attempt to invoke the trial court’s discretion 
to remove the stay and try the action. In order to preserve any 
safeguard that a stay offers plaintiffs, the plaintiffs must also do their 
best to see the foreign proceeding to its conclusion. 
Following the edicts set forth by the Stangvik court, the Guimei 
court’s decision to employ a conditional stay with periodic reviews 
of the status of the foreign action honored the fundamental notions 
underlying the Doctrine while protecting, to the best of the court’s 
 
 207. Archibald v. Cinerama Hotels, 544 P.2d 947, 950 (Cal. 1976) (“[E]xcept in extraordinary 
cases a trial court has no discretion to dismiss an action brought by a California resident on 
grounds of forum non conveniens”). It should be noted that this “rule” assumes that the plaintiff 
is a California resident. Id. at 950–51. However, the Archibald court goes on to state that “[i]n 
considering whether to stay an action, in contrast to dismissing it, the plaintiff’s residence is but 
one of many factors which the court may consider.” Id. at 952. California courts also have taken 
up the general issue of non-California residents’ choice of forum in the forum non conveniens 
analysis, indicating that although a foreign plaintiff’s choice of forum is not a “substantial factor,” 
it does deserve some deference. See Stangvik v. Shiley Inc., 819 P.2d 14, 20 (Cal. 1991); Ford 
Motor Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 342, 346 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). 
 208. Archibald, 544 P.2d at 950 (noting that a court granting a forum non conveniens stay 
retains jurisdiction and “can protect . . . the interests of the [litigants],” while a court granting a 
forum non conveniens dismissal loses jurisdiction and “deprive[s] itself of the power to protect 
the interests of the [litigants]”). 
 209. Guimei, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 191–92 (noting that the trial court’s reviews of the Chinese 
action were limited to procedural aspects alone and not the merits of the case). 
 210. Id. at 192. 
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abilities, the plaintiffs’ “day in court.” Ultimately, the power to 
resume the original proceedings provides an immeasurable safeguard 
against potential problems that litigants may encounter, or may 
endeavor to create, in a foreign forum. 
C.  Third Prong: Masters 
Monitoring the International Action 
Once a plaintiff refiles an action in a foreign judiciary, how does 
the court monitor the adjudication process abroad to ensure the 
conditions of the stay are being upheld? Again, as before, the answer 
is a master. 
As mentioned earlier, courts can charge masters with such 
posttrial duties as decree enforcement and investigation.211 FRCP 53 
provides the mechanism by which the court has the authority to 
reappoint a master to oversee these precise duties.212 By amending 
the initial order that approved the master to evaluate the foreign 
forum before the trial court ruled on the motion to dismiss for forum 
non conveniens, the court can extend the master’s duties to include 
monitoring the foreign action to ensure the stay’s conditions are 
met.213 In fact, the court could add amending the order as one of the 
conditions of the conditional stay.214 
Having a master with special knowledge of the foreign judiciary 
monitor the progress of the foreign proceeding allows the court to 
make highly informed decisions regarding the stay.215 After a court 
amends the original order, the master then would be able to 
investigate the posttrial proceedings.216 The master’s duties would 
not include interfering with the foreign proceedings (which would 
implicate issues of comity), but rather would include monitoring and 
evaluating what is occurring abroad and reporting back as a neutral 
party to the staying court. Thus, the staying court would be able to 
 
 211. 9C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, §§ 2602–02.1. 
 212. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53(b)(4) (“The order may be amended at any time after notice to the 
parties and an opportunity to be heard.”). 
 213. 9C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, § 2602.1. 
 214. This is partially because further payment would need to be secured for the master’s 
amended duties. 
 215. See, e.g., Stangvik v. Shiley, Inc., 819 P.2d 14, 17 (Cal. 1991) (staying the actions in 
order “to make such further orders as might become appropriate” (emphasis added)). 
 216. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53(b)(1); 9C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, § 2609 (noting that the 
order issued by the court may specify or limit the master’s powers). 
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make an informed decision as to whether the conditions of the stay 
are being met, if the conditions need to be modified, or if the action 
needs to be resumed in the staying court. 
These three safeguards all work toward one end—ensuring that 
the “interest of justice” is served when a federal court declines 
jurisdiction over a matter properly before it. The proposed scheme 
prevents defendants from abusing an “enforcement loophole” that 
has arisen.217 It assures that a defendant properly brought before a 
court of law does not escape adjudication. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
By adopting a procedure to stay, rather than dismiss, an action 
following a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, as 
California has done, and by enhancing the Doctrine with additional 
safeguards as suggested above, the “interest of justice” stands a 
better chance of not falling victim to the competing doctrines of 
forum non conveniens and judgment enforcement. The proposed 
process of (1) appointing a master to impartially evaluate the foreign 
forum, (2) staying the action rather than dismissing it, and (3) having 
a master monitor the international action encourages a more 
searching inquiry in the forum non conveniens determination stage. It 
thereby preserves judicial resources should future enforcement 
problems be detected early on by an individual with special 
knowledge of the foreign judiciary. It also preserves the “interest of 
justice” by giving the staying court the power to resume the 
proceeding should the action abroad implicate impartiality or due-
process concerns, as well as if judgment enforcement becomes an 
issue. Furthermore, it does not require any alterations to the doctrines 
of forum non conveniens or judgment enforcement as they are 
currently applied. With the ever-increasing interaction of the world 
population and national economies, failure to take this necessary step 
in addressing transnational-litigation concerns will result in less and 
less foreign reciprocity honoring American judgments and, 




 217. See Weston, supra note 107, at 758–59. 
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